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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The district court erred when it refused to suppress all of Mr. Vivian’s statements to the
police made as the result of his unlawfully extended traffic stop. His statements, including his
post-Miranda statements, were the “fruit” of the unlawful seizure, and should have been
suppressed pursuant to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, under the controlling
precedent of the Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals.
This Reply Brief is necessary to demonstrate that, contrary to the State’s assertions: (A)
the district court correctly concluded that Deputy Brott unlawfully extended the stop beyond the
purpose of the traffic stop; (B) the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply to Mr. Vivian’s
statements; and (C) the State’s argument for the application of the attenuation doctrine is not
properly before this Court because it was not preserved in the district court.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Vivian’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated by reference.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it declined to apply the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule to
suppress Mr. Vivian’s post-Miranda statements?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Declined To Apply The Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary
Rule To Suppress Mr. Vivian’s Post-Miranda Statements
As argued in the Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Vivian is entitled to suppression of his postMiranda statements as the tainted fruit of the Fourth Amendment violation. The district court
erred when it refused to suppress those statements. Under this Court’s precedent, the giving of
Miranda warnings did not eliminate the taint of the Fourth Amendment violation, nor did those
warnings prevent the application of the exclusionary rule.

Because the State failed to

demonstrate the statements were admissible under any exception to the exclusionary rule,
Mr. Vivian’ statements should have been suppressed. The State’s arguments to the contrary are
unavailing and should be rejected as demonstrated below.
A.

The District Court Correctly Concluded Deputy Brott Unlawfully Extended The Stop To
Facilitate A Dog Sniff; The State Has Failed To Show Error
The district court correctly concluded that “the detention lasted longer than necessary to

effectuate the purpose of the stop,” and was extended to effectuate a dog sniff. (R., p.83.)
Contrary to the State’s assertions, (Resp. Br., p.7), the district court’s conclusion is based its
factual findings, and those findings are supported by the evidence in the record.
1.

The District Court’s Factual Finding That The Officers Were Waiting For The K9 To Arrive, Extending The Stop, Is Supported Substantial Evidence

In support of its conclusion that the stop was unlawfully extended in order to effectuate
the dog sniff, the district court found:
The body cam discloses the Deputy Brott exited his patrol car carrying a
completed citation and Vivian’s driver’s license. Officer Short can be clearly
seen looking repeatedly down the road toward the direction from which the k-9
officer ultimately arrived. . . . Officer Short shakes his head several times. For 40
seconds, Deputy Brott covers the body cam with his hand. The Court finds the
officers were unmistakably waiting for the K-9 to arrive. Deputy Brott had the
3

citation in hand and, without access to the audio, the evidence supports that
finding.
(R., p.80 (emphasis added).)
The State argues the court’s conclusion is erroneous because Deputy Brott testified he
was talking with the two Boise police officers about what to do with Mr. Vivian’s car during the
period of time in question. (Resp. Br., p.7.) The district court questioned Deputy Brott, asking,
“What was the reason that you did not give the citation to the defendant at that point when you –
clearly your investigation of the citation was done. Why didn’t you go and give him a citation?”
(Tr., p.62, Ls.6-10.) Deputy Brott answered,
I was trying to get information about the parking lot. If I needed to tow the
vehicle; it was going to be in the way of the construction crew if they were
coming in the next day. And if I thought that they would be more familiar with
that area than I was.”
(Tr., p.62, Ls.11-16.)
However, the district court was not required to rest its finding on the testimony of Deputy
Brott. Rather, it is well established that, at a suppression hearing, “the power to assess the
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is
vested in the trial court.” State v. Jacobsen, 166 Idaho 832, _ 464 P.3d 318, 320 (Ct. App. 2020).
It also is well established that the appellate court “defers to the district court’s factual findings,”
unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous. State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 29 (2019).
Given the district court’s findings and conclusions, it is clear the court decided not to
accept or rely on Deputy Brott’s account of the conversation that took place when it found that
the officers were “unmistakably waiting for the K-9 to arrive.” (R., p.80.) The district court was
vested with the power to assess the officer’s credibility, to evaluate his testimony, and to weigh it
against the other evidence. See Jacobsen, 464 P.3d at 320. Additionally, and although not
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necessary, the district court made a number of related factual findings that support its credibility
determination:
·

Deputy Brott had turned off his body camera’s microphone during his
conversation with the Boise officers (R., p.80);

·

For a portion of that time, Deputy Brott also covered up the camera (R., p.80);

·

Officer Brott had given previous, conflicting testimony that this conversation was
about a “private matter” (R., p.80 n.4);

·

Any question to the Boise police officers about what to do had a short, simple
answer: “everything gets towed.” (Tr., p.95, Ls.5-17);

·

Deputy Brott was “actually stationed in the same area. So [the court was] not sure
why the Boise police … would have more information than he would.” (Tr., p.95,
Ls.5-17);

·

Deputy Brott had previously summoned the canine unit to the scene. (R., p.80);
and

·

Deputy Brott acknowledged that at the time in question, he was also conducting a
drug investigation (Tr., p.62, Ls.20-22).

Thus, the district court’s factual that the officers were “waiting for the K-9 unit to arrive,”
and thereby extended the stop beyond the purpose of the traffic stop, is supported by substantial,
even if conflicting evidence in the record. The State has failed to demonstrate that the district
court’s factual finding is clearly erroneous.
2.

The State’s Legal Concession In The District Court Precludes The State From
Arguing That The District Court’s Conclusion Is Erroneous On Appeal

Even if the district court had accepted Deputy Brott’s testimony regarding his
conversation with the two Boise police officers (Officer Short and Officer Ahern), Deputy Brott
unlawfully extended the stop for 30 seconds when he subsequently approached the K-9 handler,
Deputy Hickam, before serving the traffic citation on Mr. Vivian. First, the district court found,
and the record supports, that after ending his conversation with the Boise officers, “Deputy Brott
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approached Deputy Hickman to talk with him before returning to Vivian to serve the citation.”
(R., p.81 (emphasis added).)
Second, the State conceded in the district court that Deputy Brott had effectively
abandoned the traffic stop when he turned to speak with the K-9 handler: “at that point he turns
and the State would concede at that point he turns and goes – that is no longer a part of the stop.”
(Tr., p.25, Ls.16-21 (emphasis added); see also R., p.70 (conceding that, if the time that Deputy
Brott spoke with the K-9 handler cannot be somehow subtracted, then Deputy Brott may have
impermissible delayed or expanded the stop for 35 seconds while talking to the K-9 handler).1
The State’s legal concession is binding on the State on appeal. State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717
(2017); State v. Islas, 165 Idaho 260, 266 (Ct. App. 2019).
Moreover, as recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Linze, even so-called de
minimis extensions of a traffic stop violate the Fourth Amendment. 161 Idaho 605, 607 (2016)
(citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 356 (2015)). Thus, whether Deputy Brott
unlawfully extended the stop for the full 2 and one-half minutes after he completed the citation
and before he served it on Mr. Vivian, or whether he unlawfully extended the stop for the latter
30 seconds when talked with the K-9 handler, the district court correctly concluded that Deputy
Brott unlawfully extended the traffic stop, in violation of Mr. Vivian’s Fourth Amendment
rights. The State has failed to show error.

1

In the Respondent’s Brief, the State acknowledges this concession was made in the district
court. (Resp.Br., p.7 n.2.) Unlike in the district court, the State on appeal wisely does not argue
post-Rodriguez, the duration of the stop, if extended by unrelated investigations that are not
justified by reasonable suspicion, can be reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
6

B.

The State Has Failed To Demonstrate That Mr. Vivian’s Statements Are Admissible
Under The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine
Because Officer Brott extended the stop in violation of Mr. Vivian’s Fourth Amendment

rights, Mr. Vivian was entitled to suppression of all evidence obtained as the direct and indirect
result of his illegal detention, i.e., the proverbial “fruit” of the poisonous tree, unless the State
established that the evidence was admissible under a specific exception to the exclusionary rule.
State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 720 (2017). (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)
The district court’s refusal to suppress Mr. Vivian’s statements is not justified by the
inevitable discovery doctrine. First, in the district court the State failed to argue the inevitable
discovery doctrine’s application to Mr. Vivian’s subsequent statements; the State argued only
that the doctrine applied to the physical evidence, i.e., to drugs that were found in the car. (See
generally R., pp.62-74; Tr., p.90, L.21 – p.91, L.25.) The only piece of evidence the district
court found to be inevitably discoverable was the “controlled substances.” (R., p.85.)2 However,
as noted by by the Idaho Court of Appeals, “for each piece of evidence, there must an exception
to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to render the evidence admissible,” and “[s]tatements
are inherently different than physical evidence.” State v. Bills, 166 Idaho 778, _ 463 P.3d 412,
415 (Ct. App. 2020). Because in the district court, the State failed to preserve the issue by
arguing the inevitable discovery doctrine applied to Mr. Vivian’s statements, the State is
precluded from raising the argument for the first time on appeal. State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217
(2019).
Second, the State’s argument runs counter to the Court of Appeals’ decisions in Bills, and
State v. Luna, 126 Idaho 235 (Ct. App. 1994), and the Supreme Court’s decision in State v.
2

Moreover, the district court concluded that Mr. Vivian’s pre-Miranda statements “after the dog
alert, are suppressed,” although the court’s ruling does not appear to be based on the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary rule. (R., p.85.)
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Downing, 163 Idaho 26 (2017), which are controlling in this case, as set forth in the Appellant’s
Brief. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-8.) The State has refused to address these authorities, asserting
simply that their holdings are inapplicable because the post-Miranda statements in those case
resulted from the officers’ unlawful searches, whereas Mr. Vivian’s statements are the result of
an unlawful seizure. (Resp.Br., pp.11-12.) The State claims: “there was no illegal search, and
therefore no confrontation with illegally obtained evidence.” (Resp.Br., p.12.)

The State’s

assertion is factually and legally incorrect, and misapprehends precedent regarding the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary rule. Mr. Vivian respectfully refers this Court to his argument in the
Appellant’s Brief as his argument in reply.
Third, the inevitable discovery doctrine, while a recognized exception to the exclusionary
rule, is not one that applies to the statements of the defendant produced by an unlawful search or
seizure. The State has not cited to, nor is undersigned appellate counsel aware of, any decision
from the Idaho Supreme Court, the Idaho Court of Appeals, or the United States Supreme Court
applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to allow the admission of statements made by a
defendant as the result of an unlawful search or seizure. Rather, the attenuation doctrine appears
to be the sole exception applicable to such statements.3 As demonstrated below, the application
of the attenuation doctrine is not properly before this Court on appeal.

3

As observed by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Bainbridge,
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that a confession obtained
during a custodial interrogation that follows an illegal seizure should be excluded
regardless of whether the speaker’s Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights were
violated, and there is but one exception: that is when intervening events break the
causal connection between the illegal arrest and confession so that the confession
is “sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.”

117 Idaho 245, 248-49 (1990) (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-604 (1975).
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C.

The State’s Failure To Argue Attenuation In The District Court Precludes The State From
Raising The Issue For The First Time On Appeal
The State has also argued that Mr. Vivian’s statements are admissible under the multi-

factored attenuation doctrine.

(Resp. Br., pp.8-12.)

However, the State did not raise the

application of this exception to the exclusionary rule in the district court, nor did the district
court make any finding of sufficient attenuation. (See generally R., pp.62-73, 79-87; Tr., p.5, L.2
– p.99, L.7.) The State therefore is precluded from arguing the attenuation exception for the first
time on appeal. State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 226 (2019) (holding that the State’s failure to
argue the exception to the warrant requirement in the district court precludes the State from
arguing the application of that exception on appeal, and “[t]he same logic holds true for the
State’s argument regarding exceptions to the exclusionary rule.”)
As argued in the Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Vivian is entitled to suppression of his postMiranda statements as the tainted fruit of the Fourth Amendment violation.

The State’s

arguments to the contrary are unavailing and should be rejected.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in his Appellant’s Brief and those herein, Mr. Vivian
respectfully requests that this Court reverse, in part, the district court’s suppression order, and
remand the case for entry of an order suppressing all statements made by Mr. Vivian, including
his post-Miranda statements, as the fruit of the unlawful seizure. He asks this Court to vacate
his convictions and remand his case to the district court, in accordance with the terms of his plea
agreement.
DATED this 1st day of February, 2021.
/s/ Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of February, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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